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VOLUME XLIX, No. 3 JANUARY 31, 1952

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

CRITERIA OF EXPLANATION IN HISTORY[1]

HISTORIOGRAPHY in its primary sense has been defined as "the intellectual processes, critical and constructive, by which history is written." In method of study, the historian is said to proceed by analysis and synthesis. *Analysis* is "the testing of historical sources for authenticity and the selection of particulars from the authentic materials." *Synthesis* is "the putting together of particulars into a narrative or exposition that will stand the tests of critical methods."[2]

In one sense, a "particular" is that which exists in a document as a statement. A document may be authentic but contain statements which are misleading and unreliable when taken as evidence of some happening. Materials, therefore, have to be examined with respect to reliability of statements in making selections from materials of subject matter relevant to topics or problems under investigation. In a second sense, a "particular" is some matter-of-fact asserted on the basis of documentary evidence. Description of particulars in history consists either of assertions of what is exhibited in source materials or assertions of events having their evidence in these materials.

[1] Read before the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, Twenty-Fifth Annual Meeting, September, 1951.

[2] *Theory and Practice in Historical Study*, Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 54, 1946, p. 133. The account of historical method in Ch. V, "Propositions," is ambiguous as concerns generalizations to be derived or reached by historians, and divides synthesis from analysis in a way which neglects use and test of hypotheses. I discuss these matters in this JOURNAL, Vol. XLVI, No. 20, Sept. 29, 1949, pp. 637–644, "How Is Practice of History Tied to Theory?" Louis Gottschalk, who contributed the definitions quoted above, has subsequently restricted the meaning of historical method as employed by historians just to analysis. "The process of critically examining and analyzing the records and survivals of the past is here called *historical method*. The imaginative reconstruction of the past from the data derived by that process is called *historiography* (the writing of history)" (*Understanding History, a Primer of Historical Method*, New York, 1950, p. 48). Such further refinement seems designed to aid in defense of historical method as scientific by exclusion of synthesis. It is the argument in this article, as in the earlier, that organization presented in written history is prepared and tested in the course of investigation and is not something later imposed after facts are established.

Agreement on particulars is to be expected among historians who have worked from a common body of documentation in writing on the same subject, e.g., a political history of the revolt of Venezuela against Spain in the years 1810 to 1830. If there are differences in statements of fact, review of the sources can settle disputes so far as concerns what exists in documents and what has been utilized as evidence in support of assertions about what happened. Agreement on particulars in simple descriptions of them is not thereby agreement on significance to be assigned to them. There may be conflicting judgments with respect to weighting and emphasis. Critical methods are needed not only in examining what the historian has utilized as evidence but also in assessing how he has organized a subject matter in arriving at judgments expressed in his exposition. When a historian in describing seeks also to explain what was said and done, he engages in intellectual processes designated as "constructive." Irrespective of whether synthesis is considered an art or a science, the question arises about what is meant by "tests of critical methods" for the putting together of particulars. What constructions are cognitively warranted and what constructions are not? What are the criteria of warranted assertability of explanation in history?

Were there general agreement among historians and social scientists about the nature of explanation in history, we could proceed directly to the problem of formulating criteria. Since there is not, two preliminary questions are asked for the sake of presenting answers in clarification of the terms "historical" and "explanation":

1. What is required methodologically in order that a study of documents be in fact a historical study?
2. What is the nature of explanation in history?

1. *Procedures requisite for study as historical.*

An inquiry limited to a topic or subject will involve questions which the inquirer is seeking to answer. (Were there not something to be found out, search would not be undertaken.) Thus, in reading Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,* one's curiosity may be aroused about controversies in England in the eighteenth century concerned with arguments from nature to God. Who were the men engaged in the controversies, what did they identify as natural religion and natural theology, how did they advance and defend their views, and what did they think was at issue or at stake in their contentions?

To answer these questions requires a searching out of the relevant literature and the having or acquiring of competence to com-

prehend the content—here a content of ideas centering around the idea of natural religion. The condition of accurate representation of ideas as *then* and *there* under discussion is that of ascertaining how terms were employed in intensions and extensions of meaning. The same condition of accurate representation holds for contents other than ideas in study of what occurred in economic, political, or other human affairs. We need to know how happenings were situationally qualified and circumstantially disposed in the time and place of their occurrence.

So far as history of ideas is concerned, two procedures are requisite: (1) that of examining usages to determine currency of meanings, and (2) that of relating expressions of ideas, either as particulars or as collections of particulars under a summation, to antecedent thought. The first procedure is historical examination in breadth which seeks to discover the incidence and prevalence of usages in contexts, and thereby to ascertain the meanings of the terms employed. This has to do with the ways in which problems were formulated or taken up, the frames of reference within which discussion occurred, and the conditions, situations, and occasions which had, or could have had, a bearing upon the modes and turns of thought. The second procedure is historical examination in depth which seeks to establish influences, derivations, and directions of thought in linking up consequences with antecedents. Without these two procedures in examination of documents, the examination will not be historical, for inquiry is specifically historical in establishing answers to questions about past events reconstructed in context and course.

Authentication of documents in authorship, editions and editing, and similar textual matters should accompany these two procedures. If an author has made deletions or additions in a later edition of a work, it is the historian's business in reconstructing the course of a man's thought to attend to these changes and to ask why they were made and how they affect judgments of the man's ideas. Historical knowledge is at least knowledge of what was current in a time and place and of the temporal course of whatever subject the historian has selected to study.

2. *The nature of explanation in history.*

Since historians engage in causal accounting in telling "how" or "why" something occurred, the nature of explanation in history can be specified by making out the respects in which assertions of *cause* or *because* go beyond description of particulars. With regard to subject matter, would we thereby have (or be in a position to lay

claim to) a distinctive kind of explanation to be called historical as differentiated from physical, psychological, economic, political, social, etc.? What terms will one find in history books which are specifically historical terms?

Morton G. White, in an essay on "Historical Explanation,"[3] searches for such terms, finds none, and hence comes out with no definition of historical explanation as such. The reason why he finds the search to be unavailing is given when he writes: "Because of the great number of sciences presupposed by history, it is difficult to say which terms are specific to history." We may be sure, he adds, "that whatever these terms are, they will not be different from sociological terms."

White is not denying existence of explanation (causal accounting) in history books. Rather he is examining the claim that there is something in the content of history books which is expressed in referential terms that are peculiarly historical. The claim remains ungrounded so long as no one succeeds in showing that there is some essence, property, or attribute in events as they have occurred which is their historical nature as distinct from all other natures.

Strictly speaking, it is not number of terms coming from other sciences nor a great number of sciences presupposed in the writing of history which makes it difficult to identify terms specific to history. Terms which we now identify as psychological, economic, political, and sociological are found in the *History* of Herodotus. His *History*, however, cannot be presupposing sciences which had not yet been established. What Herodotus does take for granted in his readers are recognitions without which they will not be able to follow his exposition. Conditions and kinds of actions already known to persons who read the history are the ground presupposed for communication. These conditions and kinds, when singled out for investigations, are the specific subject matters of formulated arts, disciplines, and sciences. To call events in their occurrence "history as actuality" is not thereby to have marked off a subject matter in terms peculiar to history as written.

Individuals are historically conscious or historically minded in having "remembrance of what men have done" leading to productions of written histories which must be included among events that have occurred. There is thus a content of one kind of history which is specifically historical, namely, of that kind of history which is about histories-as-written. Apart from history of historiography, all other histories are histories *of* or *about* subject matters that are not exclusively specified by calling them "historical." When White

[3] *Mind*, Vol. LII, No. 207, July, 1943, pp. 210–229.

expresses assurance that the terms employed in histories of human affairs will not be other than sociological, his assertion need not trouble us if the word "sociological" be taken as equivalent to "cultural" in the ethnologist's meaning of "culture." The traits and characteristics with which the historian of man is concerned are those which arise, persist, and change in the actions and thoughts of socially situated and institutionally conditioned individuals and groups. His assertion may also be taken as arguing that there is not one kind of causal accounting in history books which is to be designated "historical" in contrast to another in social science to be designated "scientific." The terms entering into explanation will be the same for historians and social scientists even though historians in method and result of their inquiry do not emerge with generalizations in the form of laws of behavior.

In attempts to demarcate history from social sciences and to bracket explanation accordingly, Cassirer[4] has argued that the nature peculiar to history is found in a constructive act on the part of the historian and that this act of "self-knowledge" is "the very instrument of all historical thought." I have analyzed this argument elsewhere.[5] I shall only remark here that we have history whenever questions are being answered about contexts and courses of happenings whether they are in nature or in human society. Empirical equivalence (called "analogy" or "imagination" by historians) is a knowledge-condition of reconstructing a past that is no longer observable.[6] Admittedly actions of human beings take place by conscious intent and are valued by those engaged in them and by historians writing about them. Terms appropriate to such content enter into histories of the human and give rise to problems in those histories that do not arise in histories of plants, animals, rocks, and stars. We thereby contrast histories about human actions with histories in which man figures only as investigator and writer, but this contrast of kinds is not contrast of the human as historical and the non-human as non-historical except in the sense that only human beings comprehend and write about the past.

Another argument advanced by many historians demarcates

[4] *Essay on Man* (New Haven, 1944), Chapter X, "History." See also the discussion of "self-knowledge" in R. G. Collingwood's *The Idea of History* (Oxford, 1946), "Introduction."

[5] This JOURNAL, Vol. XLIV, No. 23, Nov. 6, 1947, pp. 617–625, "Fact and Understanding in History."

[6] For the meaning of "empirical equivalence," see "The Materials of Historical Knowledge," in *Naturalism and the Human Spirit*, ed. by Y. H. Krikorian (New York, 1944), pp. 159–164.

explanation in history from explanation in science by insisting that historians, unlike scientists, interest themselves in the indivdual or unique. The interest of historians in individuality of events and sequences of events can indeed be contrasted with interest in classification of phenomena by traits in common and in hypothesizing of universal laws. Every natural or social science, to be a science, abstracts and generalizes from things which are themselves particular or individual. No one, I think, would deny that there is a contrast between concrete individuality and abstract generalization. It is a further argument that asserts too much. H. D. Oakeley, for example, insists that types of explanation in history must be other than those in the sciences for the reason that "history involves no tendency to identify, but rather admission of the irreducible individuality of its ultimate components."[7] She does not deny that similarities exist but argues that to compare by similarities is to neglect time-processes of particulars in their individuality. No doubt comparison by similarities is more abstract than biography; but the traits upon which comparison depends, if not figments of the imagination, are locally and temporally exhibited in particulars. No doubt, as Miss Oakeley asserts, search "even for close similarities may lead astray." We can grant, too, that sciences neglect uniqueness in things and processes in seeking to formulate universal laws. Yet it is a curious championing of historians in their interest in concrete individuality of persons and their deeds to make defense of this interest by advocating avoidance of generalizations. Miss Oakeley apparently does not recognize that this advocacy is prejudical to all but trivial explanations in history.[8]

[7] *Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume XIV, London, 1935, "Explanation in History," p. 114.

[8] A. M. MacIver (*Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume XXI, London, 1947, "The Character of Historical Explanation," pp. 33–50) points out that there are levels of generality in history. Although he does not shy away from generalization, as does Miss Oakeley, he asserts as she does that historians should not seek to establish universal laws. As he analyzes the statement, "The Normans defeated the English at Hastings in 1066," this is a proposition which is "general" in summation of a medley of individual actions but "particular" as a selection of an aspect considered relevant, namely, that by military conquest the Duke of Normandy made himself a King of England. MacIver, with reference to this example, asserts that "It is not the business of the historian to 'generalize' in any other sense than this."

The sample statement is a description and not an explanation, but enters into an explanation when employed to account causally for a subsequent event. Such accounting I call "trivial explanation" unless, or until, a historian has characterized the Normans and the English in construing what was at issue in the conflict with respect to victory and defeat, and employed these generalizations in answer to a "how" or "why" question.

It is not necessary to look beyond narration by continuities of events to make out the nature of explanation in history. The very fact that histories are written by kind with selection of subject matter guided by considerations of relevance indicates that narration of a sequence of particulars is a continuity and not a mere contiguity, if, and only if, there is some kinship by which they are clustered. A continuant—be it a person or group of persons, an institution or complex of institutions, a purpose or enterprise, a process or context—is that which persists in, through, for, or with particulars as identification for putting them together. Each continuant is itself individual; but continuants are classifiable by kinds in resembling characteristics and thus support analogies and comparisons.

Examinations of written histories disclose that they contain generalizations in the form of descriptive characterizations and so far explicate particulars in assigning meaning or significance to them, with or without value-judgments on the part of the historian. Merely to characterize particulars, however, is not to provide a causal explanation accounting for how or why events occurred in some way. Thus in using the word "explication" in connection with descriptive characterization, I mean to differentiate between a generalization which construes by characterization of particulars and the use of these characterizations in statements of "cause" or "because." It is the latter, namely employment of general characterizations in causal accountings, that is here designated as explanation in history. Such explanation rises above triviality but falls short of being an explanation by a scientific law.

Explanation without employment of general characterization is called "trivial" for the following reason. Particulars, either singly or in collective summation, do not explain other particulars causally except in the sense that one event as subsequent to another and referred back to it is said to have been affected or produced at least in part by the antecedent. In this sense, I causally explain the scar on my right index finger in saying that it was caused by a chisel which I handled inexpertly as a boy in a manual training class in the Brooklyn grammar school in Portland, Oregon. This explanation, and all similar in kind, assumes general conditions or grounds of connection in a series of efficient causes, but never excludes ex-

MacIver amends his assertion about the "business of the historian" to admit general characterization and its grounds as argued in this paper when he writes, "The historical *statement* summarizes a large number of individual acts, representing a character which runs through them all" and notes that some of the individual causes "add up to something that can be stated generally" (pp. 40–41).

planation with reference to universal laws. I need hardly remark that explanation of this kind is hedged about with cautions coming from the historians themselves—warnings against singling out any one factor as *the* cause and admonitions to look for multiple causation in accounting for a result or consequence.

As an example of more than trivial explanation in history, I select the following statement by Ueberweg in his *History of Philosophy* with reference to Giordano Bruno. "He was burned at Rome in the Campofiore on the 17th of February, 1600, a martyr to scientific convictions founded on the free investigations of the new epoch." The first half of this statement concluding with the date is a simple description or fact-statement of person, time, place, and manner of death. Bruno is then identified as a "martyr," the convictions for which he died are characterized as "scientific," the investigations are characterized as "free," and an epoch (how marked off?) is identified as "new." Both the identifications and the characterizations can be questioned without calling into doubt the matters-of-fact represented in simple description. They are constructions and their warranted assertability is precisely the knowledge-problem with respect to statements rising above triviality while still on the level of description. We enter upon the level of explanation in history with the word "founded." The question, "How did Bruno come by the scientific convictions for which he died?" is answered causally in asserting that they were founded on (i.e., a result or consequence of) the free investigations of that time and place. A new kind of martyrdom is being both explicated in descriptive characterization and causally explained.

3. *Criteria of warranted assertability of explanation in history.*

Tests of explanations presented in answer to "how" or "why" questions must test also the generalizations involved in characterization. To make out warranted assertability of an explanation, the explanatory statement is assessed by three criteria:

1. A test of *reliability* in which the historian seeks to show that his explanation is *materially grounded*, i.e., it is not imposed arbitrarily and subjectively but is a summation of evidence. Besides the evidence arrayed from his own and other hostorians' working of source materials, the results of investigations conducted by social scientists figure in either one of two ways. (a) Where a social scientist has made a study of past processes and configurations of economic or other behaviors, he is a kind of historian and his results up to and including statements of social laws *sui generis* can not

safely be ignored by other kinds of historians concerned with reliable knowledge about the past. (b) Where a social scientist has studied social behaviors under direct observation and experiment and has generalized about functional relations, he has established an initial likelihood in favor of certain hypotheses to be tried out with reference to past behaviors. To ignore these hypotheses while still employing assumptions about human nature in making characterizations and presenting explanations is to give only lip service to the oft-repeated admonition that historians should be students of the social sciences. A historian who has generalized without having made out evidentially some distributed or continuant character in the particulars has not materially grounded his descriptive explication. If, further, he presents a causal explanation employing generalized characterizations following upon an examination which has established only what happened and without reference to some initially likely hypothesis, he is making a guess with reliability of the guess left undetermined. In short, constructions are arbitrary and subjective unless prepared in investigation. If historical analysis were incapable of establishing anything more than the particulars of what happened when it happened, all synthesis would be arbitrary and subjective.

2. A test of *cogency* in which the historian seeks to show that his explanation is *consistent* in three main respects: (a) it is consistent in according better with the evidence than any alternative judgment without having neglected or forced anything in the materials studied; (b) it is consistent in its own statement; (c) it is consistent with other explanations presented in the course of writing a history. In those instances where either one of two explanations appears to a historian to be tenable without his being able to show grounds in evidence for accepting one and rejecting the other, neither is to be preferred or suppressed. The first test of cogency is both material and logical, i.e., it argues reliability by reference to material grounding but raises the question of alternative hypotheses and thus of need to examine processes of reasoning in making inferences and judgments. The second and third tests of cogency are logical. An explanation may be thin with respect to documentation and so far unwarranted although further evidence may prove it to be sound. This is to say that it was adequate but not grounded well enough initially to be trusted.

3. A test of *appropriateness* in which the historian seeks to show that his explanation is *relevant*. An explanation may be reliable as materially grounded, cogent in consistency of reasoning, and yet not belong in the history in which it is presented. Appropriateness is judged with reference to topic, subject, or problem

under investigation in the kind of history the historian has undertaken to write. What turns up in investigation may, of course, lead a historian to reformulate the questions with which he began. Here he follows the leads arising from his study of the materials, and review of the materials by others can disclose where he omitted or over-stepped. He has, however, to come eventually to a decision about the compass of his work with respect to what it is designed to include and to exclude. A subject or problem as delimited constitutes the area and range for which the historian has made himself responsible, and with respect to which his descriptions and explanations are to be judged as relevant or irrelevant. If he has so restricted his inquiry as to reduce its results to triviality, or to have excluded descriptions and explanations which he could have given had he cast a wider net, this reflects upon the value of his work but is not itself a deficiency of relevance. Relevance is judged internally by what is projected both in subject and method of inquiry. Judgments of success and failure in research and exposition can not, on grounds of relevance, require of the historian that he do something he did not intend or propose to do.

An examination which arrays evidence to establish influences and derivations in a course of human thought and actions prepares the way for warranted characterizations and explanations of trend and direction. Unless a study has also organized subject matters in similarities by which to classify and compare, and has been concerned with concomitant variations, assertions of the following kind would be unwarranted: "Revolutionary situations mature as a consequence of conflict between economic classes arising from private ownership of the means of production." "The state arises as a political instrument for regulation of conflicts between economic classes, but has always been appropriated by the owning class to further its interests against the interests of other classes."

Assertions of this kind in the economic interpretation of history presented by Marx and Engels raise the question of how a systematic interpretation is tested. Explanations which appear in this or any other systematic interpretation receive no added reliability because all are, or may be, consistent and none irrelevant. That is to say that an interpretation which organizes explanations confers no added truth-values upon them, but rather marshals them in an argument. The argument can not exclude any explanation as false because it does not fit. The truth-value of a systematic interpretation rises or falls in proportion as its explanations pass all three tests of warranted assertability. A systematic interpretation can legitimately be presented as a general hypothesis, but is often made a thesis for dialectical argumentation.

Who is competent to assess characterizations and explanations presented in a written history with respect to their warranted assertability? The competent judge is one who can apply the criteria because he knows what they are and is himself knowledgeable in the materials and subject matter of that history. The logical testing of explanations by criteria of consistency and relevance establishes warrant only with respect to validity of reasoning if applied independently of the test of reliability in the material grounding of characterizations and hypotheses. The three criteria of warranted assertability stipulate critical procedures for assessing synthesis in history—procedures to be employed by historians from the beginning of an inquiry in the formulating of questions, problems, and hypotheses through selecting of particulars to the weightings, summations, characterizations, and explanations in exposition.

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SOME ASPECTS OF CAUSATION IN HISTORY

AMONG the many problems that touch most nearly the field of history one of the most important is that of causation. Indeed, it is the great central pillar, not only of historical thought, but of all thinking. As Tennyson puts it, "Nothing is that errs from law,"[1] and it would be impossible for us to think without believing in some laws in nature, the realm of reality of which history is an essential part. We habitually trace events to their causes; day and night we think in terms of causation. Through such laws we are as inescapably bound to the past as we are to the present and future. Yet so elusive and obscurely deep do their roots lie in the matrix of reality that we can not hope to do more than make some tentative gropings towards them.

An historical event requires for its adequate understanding explanation by reference to those close antecedent factors which are relevant to the event. All such causal explanation is therefore in terms of the necessary and sufficient conditions without which the event would not have occurred. It will then include the underlying universal laws as well as propositions describing the more immediate conditions. Broadly, it will be with the increasing complexity and involvement of such historical explanation that we shall be here concerned.

However they have viewed its nature, historians have generally agreed that causality is a presupposition necessary to account for

[1] *In Memoriam.*

coherence, and hence for intelligibility of past events. Even where cause is not specifically referred to, it is tacitly assumed, one proposition arising out of the preceding proposition. To the ancients causation assumed teleological characteristics; to Herodotus and Polybius a superhuman power existed which determined human behavior in large measure, and diverted it in unexpected ways; to the more sceptical Thucydides it seems to have assumed the quality of logical necessity. The scholastics of the Middle Ages in all faith believed the prime force behind causality to be God's will working in a mysterious way. But it was the Scottish eighteenth-century philosopher, David Hume, who questioned the prevailing belief that there was a necessary and essential relationship involved in causation. You observed one event succeeded by another, but you were not justified in assuming that no matter how often event B followed event A there was any causal connection between the two. All that you can say, declared Hume, is that if events A and B constantly recur together, then whenever A happens B is likely to follow, and that "when any object is presented to us, it immediately conveys to the mind a lively idea of that object which is usually found to attend it; and this determination of the mind forms the necessary connection of these objects." [2]

Yet so deeply and firmly is the notion of causation embedded in our thinking that in spite of Hume's destructive analysis it has remained, and is likely to do so, as an essential assumption, basic to the study of the past. Without it there could be no history, in fact no means of knowing anything, still less a past. The fact, therefore, that we do know something of the past would seem to suggest that whatever the nature of causation and however it works, it exists. Some historians, however, like Beard and Vagts, while accepting the concept, have protested against the use of terms like "cause" and "causality" on the grounds that they are ambiguous and that they imply determinism. The historian, they insist, is only concerned with "consequential and coexisting relations between events, personalities and interests that are intimate in nature." [3] This attitude appears on the face of it as more than just a recognition of the difficulties raised by Hume, but as also a denial that there is any causal relationship between events. The historian's concern, they would maintain, is simply to describe what happened. In this attitude they are joined by G. J. Renier, who accepts a contemporary observation that "the principle of

[2] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Vol. I, Everyman, 1928, p. 166.

[3] *Theory and Practice in Historical Study*, Social Science Research Council, New York, 1946, pp. 136–137.

causality is nothing but the formulation of a methodological requirement, of a logical scheme according to which phenomena can be arranged as succinctly as possible according to their reciprocal relations,"[4] and he goes on to argue that historians have therefore no need to wonder all the time why events did happen.

Such a dismissal, and even avoidance, of the problem of causation would seem to suggest the omission of a very important fact. An historical event is never a static entity, but is always in the process of change. Hence, as well as description of its characteristics, historical explanation involves some consideration of the causal factors in change. Here we shall go some way with R. G. Collingwood, who has maintained that to know what happened we must know why it happened.[5] We must, in Collingwood's phrase, seek the "inside of an event," the thought content from which action flows. Although this view is helpful and highly suggestive of causal possibilities on an ideational level, with which we shall deal later, yet, like those of Beard and Renier, it seems to imply a restricted conception of causation, and does scant justice to the principle and the part it really plays in history. To regard history as a history of thought alone is too restricting, because, although this view may appear to solve some of the difficulties of causation, it nevertheless is inadequate to account for much which has no such thought content, but which the historian may nevertheless need to describe. On the other hand, it is not sufficient to view a genuine causal sequence as a mere succession of events.

Our task, then, is to see whether in some sense or another causation may not have a wider and more pervasive application to history than it is generally thought to possess. In the first place it may be salutary to remind ourselves that, since man is but a part of nature, causal laws apply indifferently to him and other existing things. This has been well pointed out by Carl Hempel,[6] who has shown how inescapably subject man is to the laws of nature. For example, when we read of the decision of Napoleon to abandon his projected invasion of England, we can infer that the knowledge of a number of physical laws which would come into play as soon as any invasion was attempted, influenced Napoleon in deciding to abandon the attempt. So, too, when we find him ceasing field operations, it is with a realization of the rigors of winter and the natural conditions which make winter campaigning difficult.

[4] L. Rosenfeld, quoted by G. J. Renier, *History, its Purpose and Method*, Allen and Unwin, 1950, p. 182.

[5] *The Idea of History*, Oxford, 1946, p. 214.

[6] "The Function of General Laws in History," this JOURNAL, Vol. XXXIX (1942), pp. 35–48.

There are, indeed, no human activities which are not in some way influenced by either the sheer limiting effects of the operation of physical laws, such as those which prevent men from flying unaided, or else by their deliberate use to furnish such amenities as power and light. Such laws by their very universality determine, if not man's actual behavior, the scope of his activities. They do not of themselves account for history, but they set limits to the framework in which man makes his history. Although, then, they are not primarily the concern of the historian, they belong to the background of presuppositions against which he interprets the past.

In the main, the historian takes for his province those human activities which flow from thought. He is not usually concerned with man's habitual behavior or his animal activities, although these like everything else may have some bearing on his inquiries. He is forced in the first place, after a more or less synoptic view, out of sheer necessity borne in upon him by the extensiveness of the evidence for a human past and by the limits of his own capacity, to restrict his inquiry to a region, a period, or a problem. This very restriction may involve him in an erroneous and misleading estimate of causal influences which enter his field from without. Within the limits of his inquiry he is out to find the most important events, and we may assume that he will judge their importance by the degree to which they determine subsequent events. In other words, he will assess them by measuring their causal effect. How else will he decide what events are worth his attention or relevant to his inquiry?

Let us take, for example, the entry of the United States into World War I. We may consider that it was due to the sinking of the *Lusitania* by a German U-boat, or upon closer analysis conclude that the really important factor was the threat to the United States' economy resulting from a possible collapse of the Triple Entente and the consequent victory of Imperial Germany. How shall we decide which factor was the more important, i.e., the more influential in determining the United States' decision to enter the war? We may argue that the German threat to the American economy was the more widespread and of longer duration than the loss of the *Lusitania,* and that the cumulative effect of the innumerable factors implied in a threat to a national economy far outweighed an event which at most we may regard as the precipitant causal factor. Similarly, we may view the secret German dispatch of Lenin into Russia in 1917 as but the precipitant when seen against the tremendous social forces at work making for revolution.

But what is the essential nature of these social forces which are manifest in events? Here let us follow Collingwood again in seeking what he terms the inside of an event, i.e., its thought content. Every historical event, Collingwood maintains, has beneath its outward appearance ideas, theories, or notions which, when put into action, produce the event. Although we need not go as far as Collingwood in insisting on the need to project ourselves into the shoes of those whose actions we are trying to understand and so to rethink what they thought, we may by the intelligent use of such sympathetic devices as the imagination and by an assessment of the situation from the outside arrive at some fair approximation to what were most likely the ideas behind the events. This task varies considerably in difficulty, and in this connection we may take the case of eoliths. There the problem of discovering whether they were artifacts or only chance products of nature has depended upon whether we could reasonably discover a purpose behind them. Difficult though the problem may be, it is in the purposes, the ideas, the notions, and the theories that are inside the events that much of the cause of human action lies.

If, then, we believe that thought has an important influence upon directing the causal laws and if we believe that things thought about are constantly in the process of change, we may, before considering some of the implications involved in such beliefs, inquire a little more closely into the events themselves to see whether they can be regarded differently. Partly because of the propositional nature of language which limits the manner in which we can describe what we experience, and partly because we tend to lay more stress on the physical features or the outside of the event than on its thought content, our interpretation of the past suggests a series of discrete entities or events, all strung together by causal links.[7]

The gravamen of the criticism would seem to lie in the way in which we conceive events, i.e., in the Humian fashion of regarding them as separate things. But, although that which we call an event is in some apparent manner separable from another, are there still not some features of it which are inseparably fused to that which precedes and follows it, to other events in fact? Let us consider the matter. That which we call an event is the outcome of a multiplicity of coördinating and conflicting causes; in its climactic characteristics it is analogous to the eruption of a volcano where the earth-tremors and internal rumblings that precede the eruption are but minor events causally linked to the eruption.

[7] This atomistic view of the past A. N. Whitehead has called "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness." See his *Science and the Modern World*, Cambridge, 1933, p. 8.

This view of causation creates the impression that the historical process is a series of causes and effects, a series of separate though connected movements towards a climax which the historian isolates as the event. But we know that the effect itself becomes a cause and its so becoming is in no way a sudden cessation of the causal movement behind it, a misleading impression arising from our cause-and-effect manner of looking at the past. We know, too, were we to peer more closely into matter, that not only are causes and effects interchangeable, but that it is often extremely difficult to know when a cause becomes an effect. There is in fact no hard and fast division between the two, for the so-called cause changes imperceptibly into the so-called effect.[8]

This difficulty is to some extent recognized in the varying use to which the term "event" is put by historians. The French Revolution from a point of view of world history can be classed as an event, but from the point of view of an historian of the French Revolution itself it is composed of innumerable events. Any so-called fact is built up of smaller facts. Without such compounding or colligation of facts history, of course, would be impossible. But are there such separable events which can be interpreted in this fashion? If we believe that beneath the chrysalis-like exterior of events there is a continuous thought process, then we may assume that events are much more closely related than the atomistic rendering of the facts would lead us to believe. So that what we designate as cause and effect are not actually independent entities separable from one another but are closely bound in an indissoluble relationship. Moreover, it will follow from this argument that in our common usage the linkages between events, the so-called causes, are not only inseparable from but are as important in the past as are the events which are represented by historians as so many separate factual entities. Instead, then, may we not conceive of the past as a causal-continuum in which what we like to call causes and effects compose a unified complex? This, then, is the causal bond which makes of the past an intelligible unity, an interdependence of all determining conditions which manifest themselves as historical events.

In this process, the mind, as we have suggested, inferentially, has played, and tends to play, a more and more important part. It would, then, behoove us to consider its nature and development a little more closely. Probably one of the most salient features of the human mind has been the degree to which it has been conscious of past, present, and possible future events. As Collingwood, in expressing the view of Samuel Alexander, has put it: "Man has

[8] See R. G. Collingwood, *Autobiography*, Pelican, 1944, pp. 67–68.

the privilege of being conscious of the evolutionary process and of conceiving in his thoughts the goal towards which evolution is leading him. Hence every mind has a conception of a higher form of mentality into which it is consciously endeavouring to convert itself: these conceptions are the ideals which govern human conduct and thought."[9] Indeed, it has been an essential characteristic of man that even in his earliest forms he has apparently been able to put his inchoate knowledge of the past to good use in trying to shape a future that he has thought to be possible. This faculty of seeing a future in the instant has been of the utmost importance in determining the past, for it is from man's expectations of what may happen that purpose and intention spring, and they in their turn provide the causal energy for action. Although inescapably concerned with the present, man has acted always with a view to what he would like the future to be. His motives for action have come from what he has believed would be most likely to happen were he to follow a certain course.

What he has thought is likely to happen has arisen from his assessment of his present situation. So that if purpose has been the directing force of historical causation, the sizing-up by the mind of the human situation is the springboard from which he has initiated further development. The success or failure which has attended his efforts has depended in large measure upon the correctness and adequacy of his situational appraisals. These factors of correctness and adequacy have in their turn depended upon his knowledge and upon his ability to know. Taking a synoptic view of the past, we may reasonably conclude that by trial and error man has progressively become more aware of the causal laws operating in his environment and has so increased his grip on nature. Primitive man's appraisal of his environment and of his relationship to it was so circumscribed by fears, prejudices, and ignorance as to limit his conception of what he could do if he tried. Mind was then but in the making, and human intelligence but slowly and tortuously emerging from the heavy and dark clouds of animal stupor and bare awareness of his potentialities. It is only within the last few millenia that the intelligence has managed to free itself sufficiently to direct human affairs in a deliberate and rational fashion.

Although it may be far too early to attempt to write history largely in terms of intellectual development, yet it is clearly a factor whose causal importance in determining human history has been steadily increasing. Already it is possible for us to ascribe much of human failure and achievement to the degree to which

[9] *The Idea of Nature*, Oxford, 1945, p. 161.

man has been able to act intelligently. May we not, for example, attribute in part the apparent neglect by early nomadic peoples of the economic possibilities of their changing environment to the failure of intelligence to be forthcoming at the opportune moment? To a generally, although not uniformly, diminishing extent, this has been true of all peoples down the ages. Apart from the cumulative effects of knowledge gained and transmitted from one generation to another, the intelligence, without which any such inheritance would be virtually useless, and without which it would not have been acquired in the first place, has become the most powerful single factor in successful human endeavor. History is witness to the fact that, through thousands of years of empirical inquiry and of assessing his situation through the use of his intelligence, man has gradually increased his knowledge of natural laws. As a result of his experience, his tentative gropings made in the light of very imperfect and naïve assessments, he has progressively extended his control over his environment by invention and discovery of more efficient tools and processes. Although the actual handling of the material may have been casual, purposeless, and even contingent, inventions have begun, not with the manipulation of objects, but in the mind, where possible use of known physical laws has been made on an ideational level. Sooner or later by trial and error the mind has been able to translate theories and notions into successful action and so make them causally effective. So, in effect, through the use of his intelligence, man has been able to assess more fully the possibilities for certain courses of action. If that is the case , then intelligence would seem to be a true cause in history.

The extent to which the intelligence has been causally vigorous and effective has varied with the conditions under which man has either placed or found himself. Broadly, it would seem to have worked best in society where with the constant clashing of different personalities the intellect is continually sharpened. Hence it is from urban societies, the trading and commercial centers of the civilizing world, where the conditions have been most favorable for intellectual ferment, that the finest products of the mind have come. It was no accident that the Greek city states on the seaboard of Ionia in the 6th and 5th centuries B.C. saw the rise of philosophy and scientific thought. Such busy seaport towns as Miletus and Halicarnassus, Samos and Ephesus, provided social conditions more propitious for the fuller flowering of the intellect than were to be found, for instance, in the predominantly rural and agrarian communities of contemporary Egypt. The ceaseless coming and going of fresh faces and new merchandise, all with

their pressing problems, excited the imagination and stimulated the mind to more vigorous, more enterprising, and more independent activity than was to be found elsewhere in Western Europe. There the intellect had become causally effective to a hitherto unprecedented degree.

On the other hand, history tends to suggest that man has developed least in isolation. Deprived of a varied and substantial fare of stimulating contacts, man has generally failed to find sufficient stimulus from an unchanging environment and from the inner resources of the mind and spirit to sustain a high level of thinking and causal energy. In spite of the fact that Daniel Defoe retains a lively mind in his Robinson Crusoe even after twenty-eight years of island exile, we may strongly suspect that under such conditions even the most vigorous and independent minds would sooner or later flag into a dull, bovine acceptance of a monotonous situation. To some extent that has been proved by the state in which many Pacific Island communities were found by Europeans a century and a half ago.[10] After a period of enterprising and venturesome navigation and island settlement, forced upon them no doubt by pressure of population upon the means of subsistence in southeast Asia and by alien invaders, they gradually fell prey to inertia and a lotus-eating life made possible by isolation and plenty. Intellectually this is reflected in their aversion to novelty and change which would have been a stimulating challenge to energetic minds, and in the premium which they placed on order and tradition. Hence the mind, which once was able to surmount difficulties and solve problems, in the absence of further stimulus, gradually lost its causal efficacy and sank into a passive conservatism which could have led to a state where no history in the sense of being a history of thought is possible.

It has been, then, in environments such as Western Europe during the last two thousand years that the circumstances have been most favorable for fuller mental development. There the mind, having freed itself from many of the fetters which bound it to its animal heritage, has not only unleashed causal energy of tremendous historical significance in its attempts to turn the earth's resources to useful account, but it has also made not inconsiderable probings into the nature of mind itself. This new science of psychology and its cognate lines of inquiry have revealed the existence of causal laws operating through the mind to complicate the nature of determinism much further than was ever previously dreamed of. Although Plato was not unaware of the distinction between mind

[10] See S. H. Roberts, *Population Problems of the Pacific*, Routledge, 1927.

and matter, and although psychology is often regarded as having begun with the Greeks,[11] they seem not to have suspected the hidden depths of the mind or the inner workings of the soul. The experimental and introspective methods which have raised the study of the mind to the level of a science are barely a century old. Before then, men took varying account of those mental factors which were obviously present in human activities; but the limitations to his psychological knowledge often impaired his judgment of a human situation. Man, too, harbored the illusion that much of his outlook and behavior was free, in the sense of being uncaused.

This notion gave rise to a corollary, the acceptance of which led to much failure and disillusionment. If man could do more or less as he pleased, the idealists of the early 19th century were prone to argue, then he could for his own good be persuaded to accept a society which promised a happy issue out of all his sufferings. Practical men of affairs like Robert Owen,[12] the founder of ideal communities, and the French Utopian socialists like Proudhon, Saint-Simon, and Fourier, all thought that human nature was plastic and that men could be molded to certain social ends thought desirable by the planners. From this same ignorance of man's involved psychological make-up, no doubt, has come the notion of the common good, which assumes that if men think alike they will tend when in similar circumstances to want the same things. Since the discovery of psychological determinism modern planners have been more considerate of the latent potentialities of the mind, and have sought to provide the economic and social conditions which favor their development in a fashion consonant with their plans. The importance from our point of view of such hidden and deep-seated sources of causal energy is that their discovery will further help deliver man from the bondage of unfreedom.

This brings us to the question which must be of considerable importance to the historian, the problem of free will. We have taken a strictly determinist view throughout: how then, it may be asked, can we entertain the notion of free will? We can do so only by making sure of what we mean by freedom of the will to act in this or that direction. In the first place, free will is not uncaused: it does not imply indeterminate action, but that man is conscious of a number of choices open to him. All the courses of action are in themselves causally connected to the causal continuum. In being free he does not break laws, for he can not escape them: he simply acts in a deliberate and purposeful manner within the known limits of the law. The position has been clearly put by

[11] J. I. Beare, *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition*, Oxford, 1906.
[12] See his *New View of Society*, Everyman, 1949.

F. H. Bradley thus: "If the freedom of the will is to mean that the actions of men are subject to no law, and in this sense are irrational, then the possibility of history, I think, must be allowed to disappear, and the past to become a matter of almost entire uncertainty. For if we are precluded from counting on human nature, our hold upon tradition is gone and with it well nigh our only basis for historical judgment."[13] The presupposition that Bradley is here insisting upon is the uniformity and universality of law, even to the level of volition. Freedom therefore becomes self-determination; no fuller freedom is attainable, for it demands the deepest possible understanding of the causal laws operating in nature.

As man has slowly acquired this knowledge he has in consequence increased the effectiveness of his appraisal of his environment and so widened the range of his freedom to act. It is, for example, reasonable to assume that, freed from such fears and taboos as possessed the ancient Egyptian, your 19th-century urban worker, restricted from full development though he was by the conditions under which he lived and worked, was more aware of the true nature of the conditions and acted more freely, if only in protest, than urban workers of ancient civilizations. The history of the radical and working-class movement is eloquent testimony to voluntary action, considered to be worth pursuing in the light of general appraisal of social conditions. There can indeed be little doubt that through his growing knowledge of nature man has increased the extent to which he can freely determine his actions, for with the growth of the intellect the frontiers of necessity have been steadily pushed back.[14] Here perhaps we may see fuller significance in the Biblical injunction, "Seek ye the truth, and the truth shall make you free." There is, of course, no guarantee that because man does possess more adequate knowledge of his environment, he will act more freely, or act at all, for there are other factors such as instinctual forces and strength of character which influence his behavior just as greatly as does intelligence.

Yet, broadly, we may say that the enjoyment of free will has resulted from the greater exercise of the intelligence, and that this has in its turn led to an increasingly complex history. In spite of certain important exceptions this process is to be seen in the growth of democratic practices, giving rise to greater play and variety among social forces than was hitherto possible under more rigid and authoritarian systems of government. This social trend

[13] *Collected Essays*, Oxford, 1935, p. 23.

[14] See B. M. Laing, "Freedom and Determinism," *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Vol. IV (1929), pp. 467–480.

has resulted from the greater independence of mind and action within an ever-widening frame of reference. More and more has the causal continuum become broken up into a multiplicity of causal strands which tend to cross and recross, twist and snarl in ways that can not be foretold by a consideration of the laws that describe their earlier pattern. So are created what we, for better understanding, like to call "chance" events, events which are not uncaused but whose causal relations it would be almost impossible to discover.

If, then, our theory of increasing free play of the mind is valid, and since in consequence the world must tend more and more to become a field of contingency, what are we to say of those historical laws that such historians as Vico, Hegel, Spengler, and Toynbee have thought to see in human history? How far can the assumption of increasing contingency [15] affect the possibility of laws peculiar to history? It must surely weaken the possibility considerably, for the historicist, or he who seeks historical laws, believes that the laws inherent in history are peculiar to human affairs and are independent of the other laws of causation. Such a view embraces the notion that in some metaphysical fashion history has a meaning apart from the meaning that we give it. It moreover holds out the prospect of reliable prophecy, suggesting inferentially that the future of mankind can be discerned by reference to historical laws. It is a kind of determinism, which, as Karl Popper has expressed it, "shrinks from realising that we bear the ultimate responsibility, even for the standards we choose" [16] and is then opposed to the principle of self-determination. In the very early ages of man's history, when freedom of the will was circumscribed by ignorance, prejudice, and fear, and where his knowledge and his capacity to know his environment and himself were very limited, the forces which man generated in society, and which were fewer than now, may have been fairly predictable. But with man's gradual release from many fetters of the mind and with a more realistic appraisal of causal laws, social and psychological as well as physical, his power to act freely and independently has become so much greater as to make anything like the prediction sought for by the historicist impracticable. It would seem, then, that the more man becomes the master of his fate and the more he determines it, the less the possibility of framing historical laws to describe and predict the movement of social forces.

[15] The theory of increasing contingency can not be regarded as an historical law, but as a social consequence of a psychological law of the increasing dominance of the intelligence.

[16] *The Open Society*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949, p. 265.

May we not say, then, in conclusion, that with man's growing control over nature, the causal energy which flows from intelligent self-determination is becoming more dominant? With the greater freedom of will to operate in an ever-widening field of knowledge making contingent events more and more possible, not only does reliable prediction become less and less likely but the task of interpreting the past and of writing history grows increasingly complex.

Such, then, are some features of causation upon which it may profit a historian to ponder. They may never obtrude in his writings, but they may be contained in that fundamental body of assumptions in the light of which he will interpret the historical evidence. So may it be said of him, as was said of Theopompus by Dionysius of Halicarnassus:

> "There remains his crowning and most characteristic quality, . . . the gift of seeing and stating in each case not only what is obvious to the multitude, but of examining even the hidden motives of actions and actors and the feelings of the soul (things not easily discerned by the crowd), and laying bare all the mysteries of seeming virtue and undiscovered vice." [17]

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BOOK REVIEWS

Unpopular Essays. Bertrand Russell. New York: Simon and Schuster. 1950. vi, 175 pp. $1.00.

The Impact of Science on Society. Bertrand Russell. (Matchette Foundation Lectures, Number III. Delivered at Columbia University, 1950.) New York: Columbia University Press. 1951. vii, 64 pp. $2.00.

These latest popular books of Russell deal briefly with themes which he has discussed more fully on other occasions; they contain little new except an appraisal of our prospects for peace and survival in the present world impasse, and even this is sketchy. On the other hand, Russell, even when not original nor rigorous, is at least entertaining. The style of the present books is clear and crisp, and the continual use of logical dichotomies to divide and resolve the issues conveys an air of ease and finality which is appropriate to the popular essay, as to sparkling table talk. The anecdotes and witty illustrations, of course, do not compensate for

[17] Quoted by F. J. Teggart, *Theory and Processes of History*, University of California, 1941, p. 68.

the lack of solid documentation, but they charm and provoke, and get philosophical ideas a hearing beyond the profession.

Unpopular Essays begins with the contention that democracy and empiricism are intimately connected because neither requires a distortion of fact in the interest of theory. The second essay makes an interesting distinction between "logical" and "emotional" generality in ethics, but does not pursue the subject. "The Future of the World" lays down the various possibilities briefly and schematically. "Philosophy's Ulterior Motives" and "An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish" give a catalogue of delusions and superstitions, past and present, with little attempt to put them in their historical place or causal pattern. As a consequence the great philosophers are made to look pretty silly, and the moral is that one should be cautious and empirical. Two other essays debunk respectively the alleged "virtue of the oppressed" and the merit of being modern-minded. Then there is a running account of "ideas that have helped" and "ideas that have harmed" mankind, and the book ends with an intriguing description of "eminent men I have known" and an amusing obituary Russell writes for himself, to be published in the *Times* for June 1, 1962.

The Impact of Science on Society contends that if war can be averted the world will be a far finer place than ever before, with material abundance and working hours reduced to four or five, but that if it can not be averted the result will probably be appalling. Victory for "the United States and its satellites," if American economy could only be preserved, would of course be decidedly preferable to victory of the Soviet Union and its satellites. In conclusion Russell asks himself what it is that stands in the way of peace and the undreamed of prosperity it would entrain.

> What stands in the way? Not physical or technical obstacles, but only the evil passions in human minds: suspicion, fear, lust for power, hatred, intolerance. I will not deny—indeed, I strongly believe—that these evil passions are more dominant in the East than they are in the West, but they certainly exist in the West as well. The human race could, here and now, begin a rapid approach to a vastly better world, given one single condition: the removal of mutual distrust between East and West. I do not know what can be done to fulfill this condition. Most of the suggestions that I have seen have struck me as silly. Meanwhile, the only thing to do is to prevent an explosion somehow and to hope that time may bring wisdom. The near future must be either much better or much worse than the past; which it is to be I do not know, but those of you who are still young will know before long.

Russell's three lectures deal with science and tradition, the effects of scientific technique, and science and values, but his observations seem to converge, if they converge at all, upon the above conclusion. Had he paid some attention to the actual

techniques of reconciliation and emphasized not only the evil passions but also the human organizations which might modify and direct them, this conclusion could have been more consequential and more hopeful.

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Das Problem des Relativismus. Philosophie im Übergang zur Anthropologie. HERMANN WEIN. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 1950. 126 pp. DM 7.50.

The continuing preoccupation of German philosophers with the problem of relativism and its *Überwindung* is probably, for our times, no more one-sided than the continued complacency about relativism in American thought. But while the typical effort to escape it in the twenties still followed the lead of Kant's apriorism or (as in Troeltsch) of neo-Hegelianism, Wein uses a phenomenological method and leans heavily upon anthropological insights deriving from Nietzsche, Scheler, and (in a restricted sense) the existentialists. His new book offers (1) a detailed analysis of relativism in its various forms, sources, and theoretical reductions, and (2) a sketchily outlined proposal, in the form of an anthropological ontology, for its resolution.

To undertake so much in a compactly written work of 126 pages is to impose unjustified hardships upon the reader; his difficulties are increased by obscure and unidentified allusions, condensed arguments, over-generalization, and most of all, a casualness in revealing the author's own perspective on his problem. Yet there are also many rewards in the reading, to be won less from the major argument than from particular insights into the underlying motives of relativism, its service in purging men of their false absolutes, and the devices of reduction to which the relativizing mind resorts.

The proposed solution to the problem is not so clear, however, and will require more explanation and elaboration in reply to critical inspection. In general Wein accepts the limits of relativity and the impossibility of absolute knowledge and moral certainty. But he believes that the antinomies which arise in man's striving for absolutes can be resolved by considering the interaction of human purposes with the real world order within which they operate. Relativism, he holds, plays loosely with the ontological reference of man's thought and action. It is to be overcome (1) by a dialectic of purposive action within which men's intelligence can move toward greater agreement, and (2) by the unity offered in the

real-in-itself which is never independently known but always offers a matrix for the relations involved in men's interests and goals. Thus a fresh interpretation of the categories of experience is demanded, combining anthropological and ontological considerations, before relativism is to be overcome.

This task Wein has suggested but not undertaken. He has not even shown its possibility, and the tentativeness of his suggestions leaves the reader uncertain of their relevance for the contemporary dilemmas of human action.

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Die Erkenntnis und ihre Leistung. Die naturwissenschaftliche Methode. B. JUHOS. Wien: Springer Verlag. 1950. vi, 263 pp.

This is an introduction, well adapted for student use, to the version of logical positivism for which Dr. Juhos has become known through earlier publications. As a text it possesses two virtues—it is simply, clearly, and unambiguously written, and the author makes extensive use of an adequate knowledge of modern mathematics and physics in giving content to the analysis of method which he offers. Whatever may be said of the adequacy of his argument, the reader is never left in doubt of his meaning.

Juhos begins with a classification of empirical (as distinct from analytic) sentences into those which are hypothetical and therefore verifiable, and verifiers (*Konstatierungssätze*) which are not. The former, again, are of three degrees of generality: singular hypothetical sentences resting upon analogy and allowing null-level prediction only; laws of the first level, which assert the dependence of two singular sentences; and laws of the second level, which establish a continuity of dependence among a series of first-level laws. Laws of the second level differ from those of the first by containing no explicit variables of time and space, thus achieving a fuller separation of the order of things described from the describing sentences, or of the language of analytic science from that of phenomena.

Corresponding to the two levels of law are two levels of causality and of determinism. In terms of this analysis, Juhos undertakes a critical examination of the principles of modern physics, and then proceeds to the interpretation of time and space, existence, and the distinction and relationship between physical and psychical existence.

Two fundamental convictions separate the author from other

members of the old Vienna Circle. (1) He opposes the "hypothetists" (Carnap, Neurath, Popper) by denying that all empirical sentences are verifiable and that verification is therefore infinite; instead he holds that it must terminate in K-sentences incapable of verification and privately known. (2) The behavioristic reduction of subjective verifiers is in no sense a verification, though it is important in intersubjective interpretation. "I see blue" can not and need not be verified, and it can be defended as a sound basis for intersubjective verification.

Juhos' conception of scientific method thus involves a realism which implies limits to both the linguistic and the operational analyses of science. Existence is not a mere term; it is the independent condition for the verification of empirical sentences, and the final criterion of truth is the agreement of empirical sentences with it. Juhos does not make clear, however, the bearing of nonverifiable sentences upon existence.

The full application of this theory is reserved for a second volume in which the application of this method to metaphysics and the *Geisteswissenschaften* is to be developed. Few clues are given as to the applications which that work will make of his defense of subjective verifiers, except the statement that the metaphysical function of language is not merely to mediate knowledge, but to evoke value experiences (*Erlebnisse*).

The compact simplicity of Juhos' argument sometimes appears too neat to be adequate to the diversity of the problems involved in science, but it draws the issues clearly enough to deserve the critical attention of other philosophers of science.

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NOTES AND NEWS

We learn with regret of the death, on September 22, 1951, of Henry Waldgrave Stuart, professor emeritus of philosophy at Stanford University. After an early career as an economist, Professor Stuart was called to Stanford in 1907 to found there the philosophy department which he headed until his retirement in 1936.

On the occasion of his eightieth birthday, December 1, 1950, he was honored by the presentation to him of a bound volume of letters written by seventy-nine colleagues and former students.

We are grieved also by the death of Furman G. McLarty, associate professor and director of undergraduate philosophy studies at Duke University, December 26, 1951, at the early age of 45. A former Rhodes Scholar, 1927–1930, he had been a Duke faculty member since 1933.

The Committee on Information Service of the American Philosophical Association is now receiving applications from those interested in information on teaching positions open in 1952. It is not necessary to be a member of the Association to make use of this service. Those who registered last year are requested to notify this Committee if they wish to be continued in its files during the current year. All correspondence should be addressed to Professor Lewis E. Hahn, Chairman, Washington University, St. Louis 5, Missouri.

The 30th semi-annual meeting of the Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences was held at the New School for Social Research, New York City, on Sunday, January 13, 1952. The program was as follows:

THE ATTACK UPON THE SCHOOLS

V. T. Thayer, "Sectarian Attacks on Public Education."
Philippe LeCorbeillier, "Issues Raised in the Study of Science."
Margaret A. Pickel, "Some Dangers to Secondary Education."

RECENT EXPERIMENTS IN PERCEPTION AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

Hadley Cantril, "The Nature of Perception."
Paul Weiss, "Criticism and Evaluation of the Ames-Cantril Experiments."

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

There is no similar journal in the field of scientific philosophy. It is issued fortnightly and permits the quick publication of short contributions, prompt reviews, timely discussions, notes on new books and other journals, and news of philosophic interest. The last five issues contain:

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